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STATEMENT OF FACTS

This suit was instituted by plaintiff against the
defendant based upon the ground of cruelty, and
for the purpose of having certain real property
decreed in her, on the 8th day of May, 1952. That
there has been no children born as issue of said
marriage. That plaintiff and defendant were married
at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 12th day of June,
1
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1932. That defendant answered and filed a counterclaim claiming an undivided one half interest in the
property claimed by plaintiff under a partnership
agreement between the pa~ties hereto. That during
the month of August, 1952 said parties entered into
an agreement of reconciliation, wherein the defendant agreed to give up in its entirety the use of
intoxicating liquors, and based upon said promise
the parties resumed there former status of husband
and wife and cohabited together at the El Dumpo
four plex, 171 East 9th South and 150 South 7th
East known as El Vego apartments, Salt Lake City.
That said relationship continued on up and until the
17th day of July, 1953, at which time the plaintiff
terminated said renewed relationship without any
provocation whatsoever upon the part of this defendant. That at aU times the defendant kept and
performed his part of said agreement, and that a
complete condonation was in effect at the time plaintiff arbitrarily terminated same.
The plaintiff and defendant purchased the Harrison Avenue home on or about the 8th day of September, 1932 ·and the only amount paid thereon by
plaintiff was the sum of $125.00, and the defendant
made all other payments that were made thereon.
Said property was held jointly by the parties. That
thereafter on or about April 1st, 1936 the plaintiff
.and defendant entered into an oral partnership
.agreement wherein it was agreed that they would

2
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become joint partners and lend their efforts in acquiring income bearing property located in Salt Lake
City, Utah, and to deal generally in such property
and share equally in such property and profits as
joint partners. That thereafter on or about April
20th, 1936 defendant turned over to the plaintiff
three lots that he owned in Lambs canyon which in
turn were used in the purchase of a house on 9th
avenue. Defendant renovated and improved the
property which thereafter was sold at a profit after
renting the same. That the title was held jointly by
the parties.
That the plaintiff and defendant examined investment property known as the Monteray Apartments located at 148 East 7th South, Salt Lake City,
for the purpose of determining whether the property
would be a good investment; thereafter on or about
the 27th day of November, 1937 the property was
purchased by plaintiff, based upon the following
considerations: That on the 20th day of November,
193 7 Elias Hansen mortgaged his home to Tracy
Loan and Trust Company for $4,000.00 adding thereto $800.00, together with $200.00 applied by plaintiff
making down payment of $5000.00 thereafter plaintiff and defendant signed a mortgage for the sum of
$3000.00 and assumed a mortgage in the sum of
$4500.00 on the 24th day of November, 1937, which
was essential or the purchase would not have been
closed. Said apartments were purchased for $12,3
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500.00. That thereafter plaintiff and the defendant
signed and executed note and mortgage in favor of
Tracy-Collins Trust Company on the 22nd day of
March 1938 which money so ·borrowed was used
' mortgages of $3000.00 and $4500.00
to pay ' off the
hereinabove set forth. That the income from the
operations of Monteray Apartments was applied upon
the mortgages signed by the defendant, together with
home mortgage executed by Elias Hansen and wife.
That on April 26th, 1938 plaintiff executed a deed
in favor of Elias Hansen and wife to an undivided
one-half interest in the Monteray Apartments. That
plaintiff executed a note and mortgage on Monter~y
Apartments in favor of Elias Hansen in the sum of
$9500.00 on the first day of April, 1943 which was
later paid off. That the defendant furnished three
automqbiles, Ford, Hudson and Dodge, which plaintiff used in the operations of the Monteray and El
Vego Apartments. That the Harrison Avenue property came under the partnership agreement when
formed. That at the time of the purchase of the
Monteray Apartments plaintiff and defendant agreed
to keep such arrangement a secret, due to the ill
feelings existing between the defendant and Elias
Hansen and wife. During the operation of the Monteray Apartments Elias Hansen over a period of eight
years visited plaintiff and defendant at their apartment based on his evidence as follows:
A. "Oh, yes.

I think Mr. Beezley did sonie

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l~

he

of that, taking the garbage out, although I never
went down there. I don't think I was in that apartment half a dozen times." see defendants Ex. 31-P. 19.
That the plaintiff and defendant lent their services in the operations of both apartment buildings on
up and until this action was instituted at which time
the plaintiff repudiated and breached the agreement
between the plaintiff and defendant. That plaintiff acknovvledged the rights of defendant as set forth
in the counterclaim on file herein, by virtue of D.
Exs. 5 and 6.
That on or about July 1st, 1940 defendant
caused to be organized, while operating the Monteray Apartments, what was known as "Central
Civic and Beautification League of Salt Lake City,
Utah." That said League operated in a radias of
twenty blocks in and around the Monteray Apartments for the express purpose of beautifying and improving the particular locale. That the defendant
devoted a great deal of his time and attention to the
League over a period of approximately five years with
good r~sults.
That on July 5th, 1945 the Monteray Apartments were sold for the sum of $27,000.00, at which
time Elias Hanson was paid off in full and the accounts between Elias Hansen and plaintiff respecting the operations were balanced. That on July
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12th, 1945 Elias Hansen and wife purchased the El
Vego Apartments subject to a mortgage of $45,000.00;
purchase price $65,000.00 with a down payment of
$19,500.00 half of which was plaintiff's interest in
the sales price derived from sale of the Monteray
Apartments, leaving balance of $45,000.00. That on
the 14th day of July, 1945 Elias Hansen and wife
deeded an undivided one half interest in the El V ego
Apartments to the plaintiff. That at the time of sale
of Monteray Apartments the furniture and furnishings owned and held by plaintiff and defendant
went in on the sale of the property for the sum of
$500.00 and a bill of sale given to the purchaser
therefore.
That during the operations of both apartments
the plaintiff and defendant had a joint account for
goods, wares and merchandise with Sears-Roebuck &
Company at Salt Lake City, where both parties
charged for merchandise to be used in the Monteray
and El Vego Apartments. That the deed given to
purchaser of Monteray Apartments when sold \Yas
executed by plaintiff, Defendant, Elias Hansen and
wife. That in 1946 plaintiff and defendant sold the
Harrison property and purchased what is known as
El Dumpo a four plex apartment and they held same
jointly which is of the value of approximately $15,·000.00.
That said property is free and clear of encum·brances.
6
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court erred in finding that the evidence in
this cause was sufficient to show that the defendant, William L. Beezley, committed additional
acts of cruelty, which in effect revived the original
grounds for divorce as alleged by plaintiff. That
William L. Beezley kept and performed the
agreement of reconciliation in its entirety. That
his conduct complained of in no manner constituted cruelty.
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2. That the court erred in the trial of this cause in
which he failed to impress equity and title to
the property involved herein in the defendant,
William L. Beezley, under and by virtue of a
partnership agreement existing between them.
That the evidence and testimony as disclosed by
the record herein amply proved by a preponderance thereof that such partnership agreement
existed between plaintiff and defendant with part
performance thereunder by both parties concerned therewith.

;ola fu

3. That the court erred in decreeing unto defendant
an undivided one half interest belonging to
plaintiff in and to what is known as El Dumpo
situated at 171 East 9th South, Salt Lake City,
Utah. That no findings were made to support
said delivery of title to defendant, and that said
7
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title thereto was not in issue as framed by the
pleadings and no relief asked for by either party
to this action.
·
ARGUMENT
Point 1. At the outset we refer to the pleadings
of the parties to this action, which frame the issues
involved, to-wit; Complaint of plaintiff, the Amended
Answer and Counterclaim of the defendant, the Third
Party Complaint of the defendant, the Answer of
the Third Party Defendant, the Amended Reply to
the Amended Answer and Counterclaim of the defendant, the plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint, and
defendant's answer to plaintiff's Amended Reply,
J. R. 1-2; 40-42; 62; 31-36; 43-44; 21-23; 58-60;
74-76.
As to the above Point two issues arise ( 1) did
the parties agree to resume there marital relations
subsequent to divorce action (2) thereafter did the
defendant commit additional acts of misconduct
that would constitute cruelty under the record. As
to the first point there is no dispute as to a reconciliation and the resumption of co-habitation up to and
including July 17, 1953 at which time plaintiff
.arbitrarily cancelled the arrangement.
The court found no facts in this connection and
set forth nothing but conclusions of law. J. R. 86-90.
8
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The plaintiff testified that defendant was always
claiming an interest in the property during their
married life; so, making his demand again would
raise nothing new which would constitute cruelty.
Plaintiff testified that defendant desired Elias Hansen
to move out of El V ego. Taking her evidence for
what is is worth, the record clearly shows ill feelings
between the defendant and Elias Hansen, and such
statement, if made, would not be grounds for repudiation of the reconciliation, and plaintiff made no effort to work out other arrangements, but instead
cancelled arbitrarily. See deposition of plaintiff P.
35 "She would dismiss the case and start all over,
if we could agree on her terms." P. 53.

Q. Why did you require a deed from El Vego
from him?
A. Because he was always claiming that he did
have an interest. D. Ex. 30, P. 53.

· rbn

:cone,

If anyone has committed cruelty in this matter
it is the plaintiff towards defendant. See Trans. P.
101-2-3; D. Ex. 3 Letter. Jeanne Barton. Trans.
P. 155-6. P. 158 to 160. Wm. L. Beezley.

ptot
plamt

Douglas vs. Douglas 99 P. (2nd) 479 (Oregon
1940)

ionW

The "cruelty" constituting a ground for
divorce must be unmerited and unprovoked
unless it is unjustified by the provocation and

. sM

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

out of proportion to the offense, and subject to
that rule where both parties contribute by
miscondu~t to marital discord, neither is entitled to a divorce.
Heisler vs. Heisler 55 P. (2nd) 727 (Oregon)
(1936)
Generally, both parties being at fault~
neither is entitled to divorce.
Walker

VG.

vValker 276 P. 300 (Wash.) held.

Setting aside final decree of divorce held
not abuse of discretion where parties sporadically cohabitated after entry of interlocutory
order. The remarriage to third party does
not deprive superior court of jurisdiction to
vacate final decree of divorce. The plaintiff
had remarried after the decree became final.
McKee vs. McKee 151 Atl. 620, (N.J. Equity).
Miller vs. lVIiller, 3 P. (2nd) 1069 (Nevada),
rehearing granted 6 P. (2nd) 1117, affirmed 11P.
(2nd) 1088.
Where injured spouse cohabits with offending spouse with knowledge of his misconduct, cohabitation condones misconduct.
Where spouse intentionally brings cohabitation to an end by misconduct which
renders continuance of marital relations so unbearable that other leaves home, former and
not latter is deserter. One spouse is not justi10
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fied in leaving other unless conduct of offending spouse is such as would constitute grounds
for divorce.
See Lassen vs. Lassen, 7 P. (2nd) 120
(Kansas)
Davis vs. Davis, 68 S. E. 594 (Ga.)
Condonation is not revocable at will and,
accordingly, unless forfeited by subsequent
misconduct, operates as a complete bar to any
suit for divorce based on the offense condoned.
Ann. Cas. 1912 C, Am. Jur. Sec. 207, Page 254.
To constitute condonation there must be
something of matrimonial intercourse. Defendant is of the opinion that his examination
of plaintiff was legally within his bounds, and
could not constitute cruelty.
Plaintiff claims that her examination of
·intercourse constituted cruelty.
See P. Ex. 1 which is a letter signed by plaintiff
and defendant, under date of September 5th, 1952
agreeing to divorce under certain conditions, the
subject matter of which was submitted to plaintiff's
counsel before same was signed and executed. Regarding said exhibit defendant cites the following
case.
Grush vs. Grush, 3 P. (2nd) 402 (Montana)
11
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Wife's agreement not to defend divorce
action in consideration for agreement that
husband's promise to pay alimony should ~e
incorporated in decree, is opposed to pubhc
policy. Note 78-13 C. J. 463-4.
Point 2. This point involves the question of a
partnership agreement wherein the plaintiff is
charged with holding one half of her interest she now
holds in the El Vego Apartments, together with the
furniture and equipment contained therein in trust
for the defendant. We desire to call your attention,
first, to the documentary evidence in the record,
which we contend supports said partnership agreement, and defendant's title thereto.
D. Ex. 5 vvritten by plaintiff to Tip, a sister of
the defendant and among other things stated; "If
Dad hadn't helped Bill and I out in purchasing this
Apt." so we could earn a home etc. it would have
been difficult financially and I ain't kidding because
we are always one step ahead of the \'\'Olf." This
statement is an absolute admission of the stand defendant takes in this matter. Dated August 21, 1951.
D. Ex. 6. Deposition in case of Wm. L. Beezley
and Ella H. Beezley vs. Robert E. Buhler and Verl
Ray Summers, taken August 31st, 1951, vvherein
plaintiff testified as follows: .
Q.
A.

Will you state your name please?
Ella H. Beezley.
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Q.

Where do you live Mrs. Beezley?

A.

1 SO South 7th East, Apartment 7.

Q.

Is that an Apartment House?

A.

That is.

Q.

How many apartments?

A.

We have twenty-four units there.

Q.

Are you the owner of the place?

A. We are the owners, and operator or manager. \'Ve have a caretaker.
Q.

You mean you and your husband?

A.

Yes.

The above evidence was given under oath and plaintiff recognized the rights of defendant under their
agreement. See Trans. P. 115-16 also see plaintiff's
deposition P. 95-6.
As to purchase of Monteray Apartments see D.
Ex. 17 which is a mortgage in the sum of $3000.00
signed by plaintiff and defendant. D. Ex. 20 which
is the mortgage in the sum of $4500.00 assumed by
the plaintiff and defendant. D. Ex. 18 warranty
deed to Plaintiff covering Monteray Apartments
under date of 24th day of November, 1937. D. Ex.
21 Mortgage in sum of $7000.00 dated 22nd day of
13
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March, 1938, which money was used to pay off
balance of the two mortgages hereinabove set forth.
D. Ex. 8 reciting payments made on the mortgage
executed by Elias Hansen. D. Ex. 9 reciting payments made on D. Ex. 21 above set forth. The
moneys paid, evidenced by D. Exs. 8 and 9, came
from the revenue derived from Monteray Apartments. D. Ex. 10 Quit-Claim Deed under date of
April 26, 1938 from plaintiff to Elias Hansen and
wife for an undivided one-half interest in the lVIonteray Apartments. D. Ex. 11 Mortgage executed by
plaintiff to Elias Hansen for $9500.00 dated the 1st
day of April, 1943. D. Ex. 24 Letter Head used by
defendant in operations of Central Civic and Beautification League of Salt Lake City. D. Ex. 4 Bill of
Sale to Hudson Automobile from C. B. Dahl to defendant. D. Ex. 13 Deed to Monteray Apartments
signed by Elias Hansen and wife and Ella H. Beezley
and her husband William L. Beezley to John \V.
Springer the purchaser. Dated the 5th day of July,
1945. D. Ex. 15. Deed of Trustee covering El. Yego
Apartments running in favor of Elias Hansen and
wife. Dated the 12 day of July~ 19+5. D. Ex. 16.
Warranty Deed for an undivided one-half interest
in the El Vego Apartments~ Elias Hansen and \Yife
grantors and Ella H. Beezley Grantee. Dated the
14th day of July, 1945. D. Ex. 27 pertaining to purchase, mortgages, and sale of the Harrison A venue
property, including records of payments made thereon by defendant. D. Ex. 26. 9th A venue property
14
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which contains contract of purchase; payment book
mortgage; deed to plaintiff and defendant; deed to
purchaser from plaintiff and defendant. D. Ex. 28.
Contains Assignment of contract of purchase to plaintiff and defendant, together with real estate contract
and receipt for earnest money.

l~ar\·

ltetl

We have called your attention to the foregoing
exhibits which show a continuous chain of circumstances, both direct and indirect, surrounding the entire dealings between the plaintiff and defendant,
which in our opinion shows that the partnership
agreement vvas in existance at the time plaintiff
instituted this action, based upon admissions, documentary evidence and oral evidence.
Regarding to payments made on Harrison Avenue property plaintiff made two definite statements
that are contradictory; ( 1) she made the payments
to seller, Mr. Durtschi, and failed to obtain receipts,
D. Ex. 30 P. 73, (2) that she made the payments
to defendant, Trans. 39-41. Defendant testified he
made all the payments with exception of $125.00.
Trans. P. 124-31. Joint account with Sears-Roebuck
Co. for purchase of equipment for both apartments.
Trans. 116-18. Defendant was always claiming an
interest in the property, P. 53 D. Ex. 30. Plaintiff
would dismiss action if parties could agree upon her
terms, and start all over. D. Ex. 30, P. 35; Trans. P.
60. As to partnership agreement the plaintiff testified as follows:
15
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Q. Wherein the two of you would go, in effect,
in partnership and acquire revenue earning property?

A. Oh, I told him to do that. I told him to sell
Harrison A venue and get income property.
Q. You made an agreement to go in fifty-fifty
on income returning property, didn't you?

A. Yes, we did it from time to time.
30, P. 72.

D. Ex.

Lots in Lambs Canyon turned over to plaintiff for
investment. Trans. 42-3. As to partnership between
the parties plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. Just one question: At least as far as your
evidence is concerned, you had a partnership agreement with Bill, didn't you?

A. That he should get these other properties,
we should pool our income and try to find security.
Trans. P. 207.
Elias Hansen stated that Tracey Loan and Trust
Co. and Mr. Springer wanted the deed to Monteray
Apartments signed by Mr. Beezley by virtue of honlestead act, when the record shows that Tracey Loan
and Trust had been paid off some three years prior
thereto. D. Ex. 31, P. 12. Paid off see Ds. Exs. 8, 9
and 21. Record shows Elias Hansen borrowed
16
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$4000.00 on home four days prior to the defendant
assuming $7,500.00 by way of mortgage which raises
the presu1nptiun that defendant would sign the
mortgage. f)s. Exs. 8 and 17.
As to Homestead we cite the follovving:
Title 28, Chapter I, Vol. 3, 1953 Utah Code
Annotated, Section 28-1-6: If the Homestead
claimant is married, the homestead may be
selected from the separate property of the
husband or with the consent of the wife from
her separate property.
See Williams vs. Peterson, 86 Utah 526,
56 Pac. (2nd) 674.
That the ansvver of Elias Hansen in this cause
alleges in paragraph 4 thereof as follows:

I~

'a}

"That the balance of. the purchase price
was paid by notes secured by mortgages on
the above mentioned Monteray Apartments.
That one of such notes was made payable to
the Tracey Loan & Trust Company and secured
by a first mortgage on said Monteray Apartment house. That such note and mortgage
was signed by the defendant, William L.
Beezley and the plaintiff~· Ella H. Beezley.''
J. R. P. 49.

a1

an

ior

I~

That the above admission shows that the defendant
participated in the purchase price of the Monteray
Apartments.

e~
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Elias Hansen claims, in effect, that defendant
did not sign the second note and mortgage for
$7000.00 and doesn't recall the transaction as between the first and second note and mortgage.
Trans. P. 87 and 88. See D. Exs. 17 and 21.
Elias Hansen stated that plaintiff made the payments on Harrison property but admitted his statement was based upon what plaintiff told him, and
did not know his own knowledge. D. Ex. 31, P.
46.
As to partnership agreement between plaintiff
and defendant we call your attention to the evidence
of the following witnesses for defendant:
Jeanne Theresa Barney-Trans. P. 97 to
107.
Vernon Edward Beezley-Trans. P. 209.
C. B. Dahl-108 to 114.
William L. Beezley-Trans. P. 120 to 177;
212 to 230.
Defendant cites the following cases in support
of his contentions regarding the real property involved in this action:
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TRUSTS

In Re Barnes Estate, 108 N. E. (2d) 88:
So far as statute of frauds is concerned,
trusts, even in land, may be created without
writing. It is not necessary that an intention
to create a trust relationship be expressed, but
an acceptance by conduct of the terms which
propose that a trust relationship be set up is
sufficient. Where husband dies leaving executed oral contract which is void under the
statute of frauds so far as it relates to lands,
equity will enforce the contract and the statute
of frauds cannot be interposed by vvife's devise. Proceedings in the matter of the estate
of Hattie Barnes, deceased. Decedent and her
husband had divided their property equally
between themselves and made oral agreements
to provide the property of first spouse to die
would pass to surviving spouse, with full power
to consume and that upon survivor's death,
survivor's estate was to be equally divided between heirs of both husband and wife. The
surviving wife obtained title to realty as
surviving joint tenant and plan was thereby
disrupted. The hubsand's heirs filed exceptions to inventory of the wife's estate. The
Common Pleas Court, Porter J., held that a
trust would be declared in the property in accordance with the agreement.

In Re Barnes Estate, 108 N. E. C2d) 88, Affirmed
108 N. E. (2d) 101:
It is not necessary that an intention to
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create a trust relationship be expressed but _an
acceptance by conduct of the terms whic?
propose that a trust relationship be set up Is
sufficient. An express trust may be created
even though the parties do 11:ot understand
what a trust is and the question whether a
trust has been so created is to be determined
from all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.
Trustor's declarations prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to transactions
are admissable to show an express trust.
It is competent to show by parole evidence
the conversations had by creator of trust with
his attorney at the time of the creation of the
trust instrument.

People v. Pierce, 243 P. (2d) 585, 100 C.A. (2d)
598:
In order to establish a trust, it is necessary
to offer clear and convincing proof thereof,
but such proof may be indirect consisting of
acts, conduct and circumstances, and the
question whether the showing is clear and convincing is primarily one for the trial court.

Ditto v. Piper, et al, 244 S. \V. C2d) 5+7, CCA
Fort Worth, Texas, Nov. 23, 1951:
Appellant on the death of his \Yife, the
mother of appellee, was appointed and qualified as ~ardian of t?e estate of Elizabeth, his
only child, then a minor. In 1918 during the

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pendency of the guardinnship, and vYhile Elizabeth was about 16 years of age, appellant
conveyed that realty in question which admittedly \Yas his separate property to Elizabeth
by warranty deed. It seems evident that this
conveyance was made in anticipation of a
judgment that might be rendered against
appellant and subsequent judgment lien and
execution. In 1924 Elizabeth, then a feme
sole, and 22 years of age, conveyed the property back to her father by warranty deed. She
testified in substance that her father told her
that if she would execute this deed of conveyance, he would hold one half of the property
in trust for her, and that when it was sold, or
at his death, she would get one half interest.
The appellant denied that any such promise
was ever made by him. Appellant predicates
his appeal on ten points, only four of which
we shall discuss, the remainder pertaining
largely to procedural matters vvhich we consider of no merit. Appellant's point that the
evidence is wholly insufficient to support the
judgment is overruled. The testimony of the
appellee, the substance of which is given above,
is sufficient in our opinions to make an issue of
fact for jury as to whether or not her father
created the trust for her in this property. A
trust may be engrafted on a deed by parole
evidence. Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48,
227 S . W. 938, Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex.
134, 189 S. W. CC2d) 471.

Dieter's Estate, 239 Pac. (2d) 954, 172 Kan. 359:
An express trust may be created and must
be deemed to be established by evidence, when
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it is attacked by demurrer if. evidence manifests an intention to create It, regardless of
whether that manifestation be established by
written or spoken words, .or. br co?duct. In
a suit to enforce trusts, plaintiff s eVIdence ~as
sufficient as against a demurrer to estabhsh
that grantee had acquired title to real. est.ate
under conditions and circumstances obhgatlng
him to hold it in trust for grantees.
After case is submitted for final decision upon its merits, alleged trust must be shown by
clear and satisfactory evidence, but evidence
need not reach that high degree of definiteness and certainty when tested by demurrer
and when so tested general principles applicable to ruling on demurrer control.

Gibson v. Gibson, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
May 16, 1952) 249 S. W. (2d) 53:
Delay for more than 30 years in bringing
suit for enforcement of oral trust in land did
not preclude enforcement of trust where relation of trust had been acknowledged to exist
between the parties by their actions and its
continuance had been unbroken until date of
suit.

Knox v. Long, (Tex. Civil Appeal) 251 S. \V.
(2d) 911:
. In action to e~~orce alleged parole trust,
evi~e~ce was sufficient to sustain award to
plaintiff of one-half interest in oil and gas lease
hol.d estate, certain personal property, and a
residence, and a one-fourth interest in oil and
gas royalty.
22
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Ramsey v. Connor, (Okla.) 240 Pac. (2d) 1072:
In ejectment action, evidence tending to
show that defendant held legal title to land
in trust for plaintiff was sufficient to take the
case to the jury.

Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 Pac. 586:
Where husband and wife live together in
mutual confidence of marriage relation and
husband purchased property, title thereto,
being taken in the name of the wife, held
possession of husband and wife was joint, and
statute of limitations did not run to prevent
husband from having property regarded as
being held in trust for him. The relationship
of parties implies that the trust is to be a
continuing one until such time as it suits the
husband's convenience to demand execution
or until repudiated by wife and the statute
of limitations does not commence to run until
such demand or repudiation.

Wyse et al v. Puckner, 51 N. W. C2d) 38, 260
Wis. 365 (Jan. 8, 1952):
A trust need not be declared in express
terms, but proper written evidence, including
letters in writings, disclosing facts which create
fiduciary relationship is sufficient.

Barrett et al v. Vickers et al Trust, 100 Utah 534,
116 Pac. (2d) 772 (Dec. 10, 1941):
Evidence w a s sufficiently

clear~

un-
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equivocal and explicit to show . th~t ranch
which had been bought by plaintiffs from.
state under agreement with defendants and
intervenors that each family was to hnve an
undivided one-fourth interest and that plaintiffs and intervenors advanced down payment
but later defendants tendered their shares established a trust in plaintiff for each family of
an undivided one-fourth interest in the ranch.
Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 Pac. C2d)
940. Parole evidence is admissable to show a
trust relationship by operation of law.
TAKEN OUT OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Bess v. McHenry, 89 Montana 520, 300 Pac. 199:
Our court under these statutes in accordance with the great weight of authority has
held that they have no application to oral
contracts which have been fully executed.
Wells v. Waddell, 50 Mont. 436, 196 Pac. 1000,
1001. In the case just cited it was held and
we think correctly, that "the statute of frauds"
was never intended to cloak fraud, but to prevent it. Its aim was to avoid the aspersion of
claims whicp from their very nature should
be evidenced only by an instrument in writing
signed by the party to be charged or his agent
thereunto duly authorized. But when a tenant has occupied the demised premises voluntary for the full term of the lease he may
not invoke the invalidity of the c~ntract to
shiel? him from payment of the rent. Webster
v. NIchols, 104 Ill. 160; 2 Reed on Statute of
Frauds, par. 639. Brown on Statute of Frauds
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s. 116; Wood on Statute of Frauds s. 277; :23
R.C.L. 706.
While an oral contract which as an exevutory agreement is invalid by reason of the
statute of frauds, when it has been completely
executed in accordance with its terms, it is thus
taken out from under the operation of the
statute. Stillinger v. Kelly, 66 Mont. 441, P.
66, 68 Mont. 64, 216 P. 811, Mcintyre v.
Danes, 71 Mont. 367, 229 P. 864, Hogan v.
Thrasher, 72 Mont. 318, 233 P. 607, Gravelin
v. Parier, 77 Mont. 260, 250 P. 823, a fully executed parole contract cannot be affected by
the statute of frauds, and cannot be assailed by
the parties, or by third persons, on the ground
that it is not in writing.
The rule is the same where full performance is by one of the parties only. 12 Cal. Jur.
p. 927.
•
The part performance of an oral contract
which will avoid the statute of frauds may
consist of any act which puts the party performing in such a situation that non-performance by the other would be a fraud upon
the person executing his part of the agreement
according to its terms. Eccles v. Kendrick,
80 Mont. 120, 259 P. 609, Shaw v McNamara
& Marlow, 85 Mont. 289, 278 P. 836, 27 CJ
P. 343, 344.

VanNatta v. Heywood (Decided Dec. 30,
1920) 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192, involves agreement to make will in consideration for services
to be rendered. The contract between the de25
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ceased and plaintiff although an oral one, was
taken out of the statute of frauds by reason of
part performance by the plaintif~. The court
held "Nothing in this title contained shall be
construed to a bridge the power of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements
in case of part performance thereof." Darke
v. Smith, 14 Utah 35, 45 Pac. 1006; Lunch
Covigila, 17 Utah 107, 53 Pac. 983; Karren v.
Rainey, 30 Utah 7, 83 Pac. 333, Warren v.
Warren, 105 Ill. 568.
Point 3. That the trial court erred in decreeing
unto defendant an undivided one-half interest in and
to the El Dumpo Apartments which at the time this
action was instituted vested in plaintiff. That the
title at no time was in issue and the defendant at no
time sought said interest as held by plaintiff .

•
CONCLUSIONS
First. That the plaintiff is not entitled to a detree of
divorce against the defendant by reason of condonation as plead and proved, and the trial
judge should be directed to enter judgment in
favor of defendant, no cause of action.
Second: That defendant is entitled to be decreed
the real property together with equipment based
upon his claim therefore, as supported hy the
record in this cause.
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Third: That the court erred under the pleadings
and record in this cause in decreeing plaintiff's
interest in El Dumpo to defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
W. R. Hutchinson, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant
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